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3
Political Parties, Democracy, 
and “Good Governance”
John Ishiyama
University of North Texas
What is the relationship between political parties and “good 
governance”? The role that political parties have played is rather con-
troversial in the literature. On the one hand, there are those who express 
very negative sentiments with regard to political parties. Indeed, pop-
ular sentiment is often negative about parties and the role they play 
in democracies. George Washington cautioned against parties as “fac-
tions” motivated by the “spirit of revenge” and by self promotion at 
the expense of the public good. Currently, political parties are almost 
universally viewed as the most corrupt of the political institutions in 
modern democracies. Parties can participate in corrupt practices in vari-
ous ways—by “buying” votes, receiving illegal donations, and “selling” 
public decisions. The image of political parties as nests of corruption is 
often connected to the low trust in parties as political institutions and 
even to the low trust in democracy itself (Kopecký and Spirova 2011)
On the other hand, many scholars have argued that parties are indis-
pensable to the operation of modern democracy. For instance, E. E. 
Schattschneider, in his work Party Government, advanced the thesis 
“that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy 
is unthinkable save in terms of parties” (Schattschneider 1942, p. 1).1 
Although Schattschneider perhaps overstates the case, there is indeed 
a general consensus in the scholarly literature that parties are essential 
entities in the building and consolidation of competitive democracy. The 
notion of the indispensability of parties is rooted in the idea that they per-
form essential democratic functions, and that while these functions may 
not be the exclusive domain of political parties, they are thought to per-
form these functions better than any other type of organization (Dalton 
and Wattenberg 2000; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Diamond and Linz 
1989; Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002; Webb and White 2007).
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These functions essentially involve six primary political-party 
functions. (That number is more or less consistent with other catego-
rization schemes; see, for instance, Diamond and Gunther [2001] and 
Webb [2007].) These functions are listed in Table 3.1, below.
However, much of the concern with political parties in systems 
in transition is that they do not perform their ascribed functions very 
well. Parties in new democracies often lack coherent ideological pro-
grams and are unable to offer voters clear sets of choices. The programs 
that are offered are largely detached from citizens’ concerns (Ishiyama 
and Shafqat 2000; Kitschelt and Smyth 2002), and corruption is seen 
as widespread in such parties (Basedau, Erdmann, and Mehler 2007; 
Holmes 2006; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Salih 2003). Parties in transitional 
systems are also seen as not being suffi ciently rooted in society, resulting 
in high levels of electoral volatility as voters and politicians continu-
ally switch parties (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mainwaring 1998;
Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Thames 
Table 3.1  Six Primary Party Functions
Interest articulation
Receiving and accepting public 
demands and determining the 
process of placing issues on the 
political agenda
Interest aggregation
Aggregating demands into coherent 
programmatic packages in democratic 
contexts
Political communication
Communicating political information, 
including structuring choices among 
competing groups along different 
issue dimensions
Stimulating political participation
Promoting political participation, 
including party membership, but also 
partisanship among voters, and the 
political mobilization and electoral 
activities of parties
Recruiting/nomination
Establishing the electoral rules of the 
game, especially the procedures for 
determining who gets nominated
Governance
Forming and sustaining accountable 
and effective governments
SOURCE: Adapted from Gunther and Diamond (2003).
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2007a,b; Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005). Such parties have 
also been unable to monopolize the channels of leadership recruitment; 
hence they fail to perform the primary function of recruiting leaders 
(Hale 2006; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongó mez 2006). In short, as 
Thomas Carothers (2006, p. 66) laments, political parties in countries 
in transition tend to be “top-down, leader-centric, organizationally thin, 
corrupt, patrimonial, and ideologically vague.”
Furthermore, party systems in many new democratic systems are 
one of two things:  1) They are either fractionalized, unstable systems, 
where government is paralyzed by a highly fragmented composi-
tion, resulting in weak coalition governments (“feckless pluralism,” 
as Carothers [2006], characterizes such systems), or 2) they emerge 
as corrupt, patronage-based systems with a single or dominant party 
(Kopecký and Sprirova 2011; Tanzi 1998). 
Parties are also seen as not being suffi ciently rooted in society, 
resulting in high levels of electoral volatility as voters and politicians 
continually switch parties. This leads to poor government effective-
ness (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 
and Scully 1995; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Thames 2007a,b; 
Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005). 
Thus it has been suggested in the literature that fractionalized and 
volatile systems are “bad” for democracy. This is because such systems 
are not really institutionalized. Institutionalized party systems are better 
able to promote stable democracy than less institutionalized systems, 
for a couple of reasons: 
• First, more-institutionalized party systems enjoy considerable 
stability—generally, systems where the major parties appear 
and disappear, or move from major parties to minor parties and 
vice versa, are weakly institutionalized. 
• Second, institutionalized systems have strong roots in society 
and bind parties and citizens together. In a less institutionalized 
system there is less regularity for voters in the articulation and 
aggregation of their interests, and hence parties are less able to 
perform the aggregation function which is vital for the func-
tioning of democracy. 
Three aspects of party systems’ institutionalization are particularly 
important for the purposes of this chapter. The fi rst is party fragmenta-
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tion. Indeed, party fragmentation makes effective governance quite dif-
fi cult (Duverger 1954). Many small parties in a system often create the 
conditions for weak coalition governments, which are particularly prob-
lematic during times of political or economic duress or crisis (which is 
often the case in the developing world). An often-cited example of the 
negative effects of party system fragmentation is the Weimar Republic 
in Germany in the 1920s, which had a highly fragmented (and ideologi-
cally polarized) party system.
Another aspect of party systems that is posited as having a negative 
effect on governance is party system volatility. Party system volatil-
ity refers to the extent to which voters are lacking a stable set of party 
competitors over time. Party systems that are characterized by many 
changes in terms of vote share or composition are volatile systems. It 
has been argued that volatile systems do not promote effective gover-
nance, for a variety of reasons. First, party system volatility reduces 
accountability. When partisan actors come and go, it does not provide 
the opportunity for voters to “throw the rascals out”  in case they have 
made poor policy choices, because the rascals no longer occupy offi ce 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Furthermore, volatility signifi cantly in-
creases uncertainty, hampering the ability of politicians and voters to 
engage in strategically driven coordination and formulate coherent pol-
icies. Finally, it raises the stakes of the electoral game. This may have 
the consequence of weakening the democratic commitment of politi-
cians, who may seek other ways to insure themselves against possible 
political loss at the next election—such as through corrupt actions or, 
even worse, vote-rigging and electoral violence. 
A third pathology of party system development is the emergence 
of a dominant party system. One-party dominance has not necessar-
ily been associated with ineffective governance in the literature, but it 
has been associated with the promotion of corruption. A major cause 
of corruption is political parties seeking to gain political resources by 
selling off access to offi ce to the highest bidder (Katz and Mair 1995). 
One-party dominance leads to more corruption, as the dominant party 
keeps power by distribution of patronage and other manipulations 
(Tanzi 1998). Thus, one-party or dominant-party rule is seen as gener-
ally inimical to good governance, and it is especially associated with 
higher levels of corruption than more competitive systems.
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Although the ills associated with party systems have often been sug-
gested in the scholarly work, there has been remarkably little empirical 
literature that directly assesses the relationship between characteristics 
of the party system and levels of good governance. What are the ef-
fects of fragmentation, volatility, and one-party dominance on aspects 
of good governance?
The above literature suggests the following three hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Party systems’ fragmentation is negatively related 
to government effectiveness.
• Hypothesis 2: Party volatility is negatively related to govern-
ment effectiveness.
• Hypothesis 3: One-party-dominant regimes are negatively 
related to control of corruption (i.e., positively related to 
corruption).
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The following analysis is a fi rst attempt at trying to assess the rela-
tionship between characteristics of party systems and good governance. 
The sample of countries used in this study includes 92 developing states 
that have had at least  three “competitive” legislative elections during 
the period 1975–2006 and that are also classifi ed as middle- to low-
income countries by the World Bank. These countries were also not 
completely controlled by the governing party (and so would qualify as 
having a “party system,” which suggests the existence of more than one 
party). In other words, countries entered the data set if the opposition 
controlled at least some seats in the legislature. (Thus, countries like 
North Korea are not included in the data set.) The time period cov-
ered begins with 1975, which coincides with what Samuel Huntington 
(1991) labeled the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization, 
and goes until 2006, the last year in which all data are available. 
The dependent variables in this study include three of the World 
Bank's six Worldwide Governance Indicators, all measured from 2003 
to 2010. The argument here is that characteristics of the party system 
up15sapeogch3.indd   39 5/27/2015   1:10:41 PM
40   Ishiyama
from 1975 to 2006 should affect government performance in the more 
recent period from 2003 to 2010.
• The fi rst dependent variable, government effectiveness, is con-
ceptualized as comprising the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s com-
mitment to such policies. The values range from −2.5 to  +2.5, 
with negative scores indicating less effective government and 
positive values indicating more effective government.
• The second dependent variable, control of corruption, is also 
scored from −2.5 to  +2.5 and refl ects perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” 
of the state by elites and private interests. In this case, negative 
scores indicate less effective control of corruption, whereas 
positive scores indicate relatively higher levels of control of 
government corruption.
• The third dependent variable for this study, political stability, 
is likewise scored from  −2.5 to  +2.5, and is conceptualized as 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be de-
stabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically motivated violence and terrorism. Positive 
scores on this measure indicate higher levels of political stabil-
ity, and negative values mean lower levels of political stability.
Two of the primary independent variables, party systems fragmen-
tation and party systems volatility, are measured by two commonly 
employed measures in the literature. The fi rst, measuring the extent 
to which a party system is fragmented, is the “effective number of 
political parties” (ENP) measure. This index proposes the use of the 
Hirschman-Herfi ndahl concentration index to measure the fragmenta-
tion of a party system based on vote shares in the election or seat shares 
in the legislature. Using vote or seat shares in the computation of the 
Hirschman-Herfi ndahl index and taking the inverse gives us the ENP.2 
I include the average number of effective political parties for a given 
number of elections, ranging from a minimum of the fi rst three to a 
maximum of the fi rst fi ve legislative elections after 1975. This, again, is 
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to examine how earlier levels of party fragmentation affect later levels 
of good governance. 
Second, to measure party systems’ volatility, I use Pedersen’s index 
of electoral volatility to calculate legislative volatility. Pedersen’s index 
measures the net change in each party’s seat share in the lower house 
of the legislature from election to election. It is calculated by summing 
the net changes in the percentage of seats won or lost by each of the 
parties from election to election and dividing by two (see Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; and Mozaffar, Scarritt, 
and Galaich 2003). This is written as
V = Σ |ci,t +1 – ci,t | / Σ ci,t +1 + Σ ci,t ,
 
where V is volatility, ci,t is the vote share of continuous party i at the fi rst 
election (t), and ci,t+1 is the vote share of continuous party i at the second 
election (t + 1).
The resulting score for each country is an average score across each 
of the legislative periods. Again, I use the fi rst three to fi ve elections 
after 1975 to examine how earlier levels of party systems’ volatility 
affect later levels of effective governance, control of corruption, and 
political stability.
Finally, I examine the effects of a dominant party on measures of 
governance. For my purposes, I use the defi nition of a dominant party 
system taken from Van de Walle and Butler (1999), who defi ne a domi-
nant party as a party that wins at least 60 percent of the seats in the 
lower house of the legislature for the fi rst three consecutive elections 
following the introduction of competitive elections.
In addition to the primary independent variables, I also include 
a number of control variables in the analysis that can affect levels of 
government effectiveness, control of corruption, and political stability. 
These include
• economic growth rates measured in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita;
• average growth rate over the posttransition period;
• a measure of wealth (GDP per capita average over the post-
transition period); and
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• the level of ethnolinguistic fragmentation (ELF), a commonly 
used measure of the extent of ethnic heterogeneity in a country.
 In addition, I examine whether or not the country had experienced 
a civil war (given that such countries often face challenges in terms of 
good governance) and a measure of democracy as indicated by the aver-
age Polity2 score (a commonly used measure of the level of democracy) 
over the entirety of the posttransition period. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Tables 3.2 through  3.4 provide the results of the analysis. Given the 
continuous nature of the dependent variable, I employ a simple ordinary 
least squares (OLS) procedure. Coeffi cient estimates are reported as 
well as collinearity diagnostic statistics and the variance infl ation factor 
scores. Table 3.2 reports the results of regressing the dependent variable 
of the government effectiveness score against the list of independent 
variables.
As indicated in the table, party fragmentation does not affect govern-
ment effectiveness, which is contrary to what was expected. However, 
both the emergence of a dominant party and party system volatility in 
earlier years led to less government effectiveness later. In part this may 
be due to the transformation of initially very volatile party systems into 
dominant party systems later (such as the case of the Russian Federa-
tion since the 1990s). Furthermore, this result would call into question 
the commonly held sentiment that political systems that exhibit a “fi rm 
hand” are more effective and effi cient. The evidence clearly does not 
support this contention.
One interesting thing to note is that post–civil war states are signifi -
cantly less effective (in terms of their effective governance scores) than 
other states in the sample. This is not a surprising result, given that civil 
wars often undermine state capacity, but it is noteworthy nonetheless. 
Table 3.3 regresses the second dependent variable, average con-
trol of corruption, against the list of independent variables. The results 
demonstrate that none of the primary independent variables are related 
to the control of corruption. These results call into question the notion 
that dominant party systems tend to promote corruption more than other 
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types of party systems. This is clearly not indicated by the results re-
ported in Table 3.3.
Furthermore, as in Table 3.2, which shows that post–civil war states 
have less government effectiveness, so too in Table 3.3, post–civil war 
states are signifi cantly less able to control corruption. Again, this is 
probably due to the weakened capacity of such states as a result of civil 
war.
Finally, Table 3.4 reports the results of regressing the dependent 
variable of political stability against the independent variables. Inter-
estingly, none of the primary independent variables (average effective 
number of parties over fi rst three elections after transition, existence 
of dominant party over fi rst three elections, and party system volatility 
over fi rst three elections) has any bearing at all on the level of political 
stability later.
Table 3.2  Coeffi cient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent 
Variable: Average Governmental Effectiveness, 2003–2010
Variable Coeffi cient VIF





Existence of dominant party over fi rst three elections −0.358**
(0.154)
1.540
Party systems’ volatility over fi rst three elections −0.009**
(0.004)
1.077





Average GDP per capita over posttransition period 0.0005**
(0.000)
1.392
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index −0.341
(0.301)
1.193
Post–civil war state −0.280**
(0.140)
1.139




Adjusted R-squared = 0.300
NOTE: * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance infl ation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.”
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Again, as was the case with government effectiveness and corrup-
tion, post–civil war states are inherently less stable than other states. It 
should be noted that in all of the models, the variance infl ation scores 
did not exceed 2, so there are no problems indicated with multicol-
linearity in the analysis.
Thus, in sum, the above fi ndings do not suggest support for the 
initial supposition that party fragmentation would be negatively re-
lated to government effectiveness. Indeed, the number of parties (in 
cases where there are more than one) is unrelated to the extent to which 
governments are effective. However, party system volatility and the 
emergence of dominant party systems are negatively related to gov-
ernment effectiveness. Dominant parties are not particularly effective 
at government administration, and neither are highly volatile systems 
Table 3.3   Coeffi cient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent 
Variable: Average Control of Corruption, 2003–2010
Variable Coeffi cient VIF










Party system’s volatility over fi rst three elections −0.004
(0.004)
1.077





Average GDP per capita over transition period 0.0003**
(0.000)
1.392
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index −0.115
(0.299)
1.193
Post–civil war state −0.328**
(0.130)
1.139




Adjusted R-squared = 0.188
NOTE: * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance infl ation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.”
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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where there is substantial turnover in the political actors involved in 
the game. However, these variables are not related to corruption and 
political stability, which might suggest, among other things, that the 
relationship between corruption and dominant parties is overstated.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has been essentially a suggestive piece, with the use of 
data to illustrate the relationship between party system characteristics 
and three aspects of good governance—namely, 1) effective governance, 
Variable                                                                        Coeffi cient VIF





Existence of dominant party over fi rst three elections −0.106
(0.160)
1.540
Party system’s volatility over fi rst three elections −0.000
(0.004)
1.077





Average GDP per capita over transition period 0.0005**
(0.000)
1.392
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index −0.158
(0.301)
1.193
Post–civil war state −0.938***
(0.137)
1.139




Adjusted R-squared = 0.486
NOTE: * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance infl ation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.”
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 3.4   Coeffi cient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent 
Variable: Average Political Stability Score, 2003–2010
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2) control of corruption, and 3) political stability. Generally, the results 
indicate that either dominant party systems or volatile party systems are 
associated with lower levels of effective governance. However, neither 
of these party system characteristics are related to the control of corrup-
tion and political stability. This would suggest that if one conceives of 
“good governance” in terms of effective governance, then promoting a 
stable set of competitive political parties is probably a good way to go. 
This would add support for programs such as those sponsored by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which seeks to 
promote the development of stable party systems in many new democ-
racies throughout the world. 
On the other hand, party system characteristics have little to do with 
either the control of corruption or the promotion of political stability. 
This would counter some of the existing literature that suggests that 
dominant party systems are more corrupt, and that stable party systems 
would lead to political stability. As to the former, one can imagine a 
situation (as in the case of many competitive party systems in Western 
democracies in their earlier periods of development) where competitive 
politics bred corruption such as vote rigging, multiple voting, patron-
age, and the like. Certainly this has been part of the history of political 
parties in the United States, as well as in other Western countries, so it 
is no wonder that competitive party systems are just as likely to fail to 
control corruption as dominant party systems.
It is also not particularly surprising that volatility is unrelated to 
political stability (at least as conceived of in terms of the likelihood of 
violent overthrow). Indeed, in several cases in the West, most notably in 
post–World War II Italy, party system fragmentation and volatility led 
to governmental instability but did not threaten the political stability of 
the country. In part, this political stability was supported by a continu-
ous group of political leaders. In other words, governments and parties 
may have come and gone in Italy, but the leadership elite remained in-
tact, thus contributing to the continuance of political stability (in terms 
of absence of violence), albeit not government stability (in terms of 
the stability of coalition governments). Thus, at least in Italy, it is not 
particularly surprising that party system characteristics are unrelated to 
political stability as well. 
These main fi ndings of this chapter are, of course, somewhat ten-
tative. There are a number of areas for improvement in the analysis. 
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For instance, perhaps the key variable affecting good governance is not 
the party system, but party organization characteristics. In other words, 
parties that are more internally democratic may be more effective than 
parties that are less internally democratic, for instance. Second, it would 
be preferable to use panel data rather than a simple set of cross-sectional 
data (albeit with a lagged set of independent variables). Third, there 
may be individual country effects that would need to be controlled for 
by a fi xed-effects model. Finally, in terms of the political stability anal-
ysis, a future paper might examine the relationship between political 
party systems and state failure—perhaps by using some form of hazard 
analysis instead of the World Bank’s measure equating stability with no 
violence. Whatever the case, understanding the relationship between 
party system characteristics and good governance will remain a fruitful 
topic for future research. 
Notes
1. Although, historically, there has been debate over the defi nition of a political party 
in the scholarly literature, we use the classic defi nition of the political party as 
offered by Anthony Downs (1957, p. 25): a political party is “a team seeking to 
control the governing apparatus by gaining offi ce in a duly constituted election.” 
See also Epstein (1967), Janda (1980), and Sartori (1976). For an alternative and 
stricter defi nition of party, see LaPalombara and Weiner (1966). For the debate 
over the defi nition of parties, see Ishiyama and Breuning (1998).
2. ENP = 1/∑pi
2, where pi denotes the ith party’s fraction of the seats (or vote shares). 
See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989); see also 
variations of the fragmentation index: Dunleavy and Boucek (2003), Molinar 
(1991), and Rae (1967).
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